The Illegal Migration Bill Impact Assessment Digested: Read it and Weep

Yesterday the Home Office Impact Assessment for the Illegal Migration Bill was released. It is 40 pages, so there is a lot to wade through. Many news outlets picked up on some of the headline figures. But headline figures, which sound very costly, hide a much more troubling reality. The Home Office has no idea if the policy will be successful, and there is almost no evidence to suggest that its central assumption -the deterrent effect- exists. In addition to that, the Home Office also has little real idea of how much the policy will cost. Below I summarise the 40 page Impact Assessment which will demonstrate these inconvenient truths.

First the context. The Impact Assessment explains that increased small boats crossings in the Channel since 2018 have increased pressures in the UK asylum system. These pressures include administrative pressure, so it now takes longer to make decisions on asylum applications. The length of time plus the increase in applications creates a greater financial burden in providing housing and other support to people awaiting a decision on their asylum application. The government has decided that the best way to solve these issues is for these people to not be present in the UK, even where they intend to make an asylum claim or modern slavery claim. On this basis, the Bill aims to prevent future arrivals through deterrence (punish people now to deter imagined others in the future). The Bill also aims to break the business model of smugglers, through deterring people who may want to use their services.

The Impact Assessment explains that academic evidence challenges the notion of deterrence effects. However, it states that international examples suggest that a mix of deterrence and enforcement action can impact arrival numbers. Australia is cited as a successful example. In fact, the data here is misunderstood. The significant drop-off in boat arrivals in Australia in 2013 noted in the Impact Assessment occurred only after interceptions at sea were introduced. Deterrence through threats of offshore processing, which was practiced previously, was not a deterrent to boat arrivals. Because of the nature of the English Channel, boats cannot be intercepted at sea and returned to France, nor immediately escorted to a third territory. Morocco/Spain is cited as another example. In fact, the approach in Morocco was broadly the same as the UK approach in France of increasing border control, which has already been unsuccessful in stopping the Channel boats, and is not evidence of a deterrence effect working. A recent return agreement with Albania is cited as evidence of a deterrent effect, though it seems much more likely that the highly organsied Albanian smugglers and traffickers have found alternative routes for their efficient business than that they have completely abandoned it altogether. Go to Calais and you will hear people talking about this. In short, none of the international examples evidence the effectiveness of deterrence based policies. 

Aside from standing on this shaky ground, the cost estimates are vague in the extreme. The cost of implementing the Bill cannot be properly estimated, the Impact Assessment states, partly because the Bill is new and untested, practical implementation plans are uncertain (e.g .how many detention places will be available, how many people can/will be deported), changes to irregular routes cannot be predicted, and there are many cost uncertainties (e.g. fees requested by third countries and private companies running detention centres and deportation flights). It is estimated that deporting one person to Rwanda will cost £105,000 per person based on the cost of resettling one Syrian to the UK under the Syrian Resettlement Scheme. It is uncertain whether this reflects the cost of relocating UK asylum seekers to third countries, including Rwanda. Costs of deportation are estimated at £22,000 but there is no certainty that this is accurate since it is not clear how many people will be deported on each flight. Costs of detention are estimated at £7,000 based on someone being detained for 40 days. It is not clear why 40 days was selected. Costs associated with someone challenging their designation as inadmissible are estimated at £18,000 per person based on ‘internal calculations’. Legal aid costs are estimated at £1000 per person, with no calculation for appeal costs. It is not clear what this is based on. A total estimated cost per person based on all of these shaky assumptions, uncertainties and with many un-costed dimensions is £169,000 per person deported to a third country.

No calculation has been made for the costs incurred in housing or supporting people who cannot be deported within 40 days. Costs associated with opening new detention centres, and staff recruitment and training costs in the Home Office and Border Force have not been calculated. Costs to the Ministry of Justice connected to increasing the number of lawyers, judges, increased legal aid, expanding the physical space for cases to be heard, professional services costs, and potential third country asylum processing costs have all also not been calculated. These cost savings cannot be specified due to the novelty of the new policy regime, though the Impact Assessment identifies each of these as likely costs associated with implementing the Bill.

Because there are so many uncertainties, it is not possible to estimate a value for money assessment, the Impact Assessment explains. But if 1000 people are successfully relocated as planned in given timeframes the cost is estimated at £63million. That is, £2.835 billion per year if numbers continue in line with 2022. But there are possible cost savings in relation to the running of the asylum system as it currently exists, some other public services and the Modern Slavery Referral Mechanism if the deterrence effect works, and if enough people are returned or relocated to a third country. The government is calculated to save £106,000-£165,000 per person in accommodation and asylum support costs. 37% of current numbers need to be successfully deterred in order for the policy to be cost neutral the Impact Assessment estimates (though based on many uncertainties). 

All costs, which cannot be estimated, but might be upwards of £2.8 billion per year, will be borne by the public sector.

Alongside this, there are of course massive human costs which have been well documented. 7% of people crossing in small boats are currently referred to the National Modern Slavery Referral Mechanism, as the Impact Assessment explains. The vast majority of people who cross apply for asylum, and many of those applicants are in the top nationalities for recognition as refugees. So in sum, the government’s Impact Assessment suggests that our current government is willing to pay almost any amount of (as yet unspecified) money in order to prevent people seeking asylum, or being rescued from situations of trafficking and modern slavery.